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COLLOQUIUM
Appellate Court Voting Rules

INTRODUCTION
During the 1996 term, the United States Supreme Court made
a candid confession about its voting practices. In Seminole Tribe of

Florida v. Florida,1 the Court overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co.2 and recognized that when a justice defers to the majority against
his or her own reasoning inconclusive precedent results. 3 Union Gas

was particularly unusual because Justice White switched his vote to
assure a result in a three-remedy case where none of the three
remedies had the support of a majority.4 In Seminole Tribe, the Court
admitted Union Gas "has, since its issuance, been of questionable
precedential value, largely because a majority of the Court expressly
disagreed with the rationale of the plurality."5 Accordingly, the Court
recognized the problems created when a justice votes against his or
her own reasoning to ensure a result.
While scholars frequently have analyzed the strategic voting
practices of legislators,6 similar analysis of voting on judicial panels is
relatively new. Frank Easterbrook was the first scholar to apply
Arrow's Theorem systematically to the Supreme Court's voting
practice, 7 and several scholars followed his lead.8 After Justice
1.

116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1996).

2.

491 U.S. 1 (1989).
Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1127-28.

3.

4.
Union GaR, 491 U.S. at 56-57 (White, J., concurring in part) (deferring to the majority
on whether Congress expressly abrogated the states' eleventh amendment immunity under
CERCLA and thus concurring in a judgment contrary to his own analysis). See also Arizona v.
Fulminante,499 U.S. 279, 313-14 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
5
Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
6.
See, for example, Saul Levmore, ParliamentaryLaw, Majority Decisionmaking, and
the Voting Paradox, 75 Va. L. Rev. 971 (1989); Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74
Va. L. Rev. 167, 167-518 (1988); Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof
Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873 (1987).

7.
(1982).

Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 819-20
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practice,7 and several scholars followed his lead. 8 After Justice
White's vote in Union Gas, Professor John Rogers warned the Court
against abdicating its role as a reasoned decision maker. He
concluded, however, that the contradictory vote in Union Gas was
aberrational. 9
More recently, Professors David Post and Steven Salop
published an article encouraging multimember courts to abandon
their traditional practice of outcome voting and instead to adopt a
Shortly thereafter, Professors Lewis
system of issue voting.'0
Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager urged appellate courts to adopt
neither outcome voting nor issue voting as a rule. Rather, they
suggested appellate courts should take a metavote on whether
outcome or issue voting should control each case." Professor Maxwell
Stearns advanced the debate over appellate court voting in a trilogy of
articles published over the past two years. These articles apply social
choice theory to the Supreme Court, providing an evolutionary
12
analysis of outcome voting, stare decisis, and standing.
The investigation of appellate court voting rules has become all
the more intriguing following Seminole Tribe. Recognizing the
important insights to be gained from an intense investigation of
appellate court voting rules, the Vanderbilt Law Review has
organized the following Colloquium to discuss whether appellate
courts should continue using the traditional practice of outcome
voting or whether such courts should adopt a system of issue voting.
Professor John Rogers's article, 'ssue Voting" by Multimember
3 serves as
Appellate Courts: A Response to Some Radical Proposals,1
the impetus for this discussion.
In his provocative article, Professor Rogers responds to the
issue voting proposals of Professors Post, Salop, Kornhauser, and
Sager by describing some unforeseen problems issue voting would
7.

Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 819-20

(1982).

See, for example, Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court,
8.
96 Yale L. J. 82 (1986).
9.
See generally John M. Rogers, "I Vote This Way Because I'm Wrong" The Supreme
Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 Ky. L. J. 439 (1991).
10. See generally David Post and Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A
Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels,80 Georgetown L. J. 743 (1992).
11. See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts,81 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1993).
12. See generally Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103
Yale L. J. 1219 (1994); Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciabilityand Social Choice, 83 Cal.
L. Rev. 1309 (1995); Standing and Social Choice: HistoricalEvidence, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 309
(1995).
13. 49 Vand. L. Rev. 997 (1996).
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create. Rogers observes that none of the scholars who support issue
voting suggests how issues should be determined for the collective
issue vote. Indeed, Rogers shows how relatively simple constitutional
cases involve issues that can be divided into any number of subissues
and sub-subissues, which in turn can be manipulated by an agenda
setter to produce a desired result. After describing the impracticality
of issue voting, Rogers defends outcome voting against the claims that
it is a non-Condorcet-producing rule. Rogers further defends outcome
voting against the claims of Professors Post and Salop, Kornhauser
and Sager, and Stearns that it produces path dependent legal
doctrine. In essence, Rogers argues the problems created by issue
voting would far outweigh the occasional incoherence caused by the
traditional voting practice of appellate courts.
Professor Maxwell Stearns's reply, How Outcome Voting
Promotes Principled Issue Identification,14 provides a social choice
evaluation of the issue voting versus outcome voting debate. Stearns
first takes issue with Rogers's understanding of several social choice
concepts, focusing on Rogers's discussion of Condorcet winners and
Condorcet-producing rules.
He contends that although outcome
voting is a non-Condorcet-producing rule, it remains a better
alternative than issue voting. While Stearns agrees the number of
issues in each case can be divided into several subissues, he argues
the number of issues in a given case is fairly stable and small within
an outcome-voting regime. Finally, Stearns suggests that outcome
voting avoids strategic issue identification by encouraging judges to
identify the genuine legal issues in each case.
Professors David Post and Steven Salop provide the final reply,
Issues and Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeterminacy,15 which responds
to some of Rogers's concerns and further elaborates the authors' support for issue voting. Post and Salop argue outcome voting produces
precedent that provides uncertain guidance to lower courts. In response to Rogers's contention that issues can be divided any number
of ways, Post and Salop propose a procedural rule to control the
number of issues in a given case. These authors conclude the
discussion by admonishing the Court to adopt issue voting explicitly
as a solution to the problems associated with current appellate
practice.
The Vanderbilt Law Review expresses its gratitude to these
scholars for taking this opportunity to discuss the anomalies created

14.
15.

49 Vand. L. Rev. 1045 (1996).
49 Vand. L. Rev. 1069 (1996).
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by appellate review. Hopefully this Colloquium will spark further
debate on this subject as judges, scholars, and practitioners begin to
understand the nuances of appellate court voting and its impact on
the path of the law.
Scott B. Smith
Senior Articles Editor

